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The attempt to expand small business enterprise in South Korea is in peril. After the
1997 financial crisis, while economic circumstances in the country were still highly
uncertain, the government intervened in the diffusion of venture business firms, which
were a newly emerging form of small business in South Korea. I argue that the Korean
government’s system of selecting prominent venture firms succeeded in increasing the
number of venture businesses in Korea, but that, while trying to do so in a very short
time, it also endorsed firms which were hardly promising. Using the Cox proportional
hazard model as my main research tool, I find that when the criteria of endorsement are
ambiguous, firms exposed to higher environmental uncertainty and showing poor mar-
ket performance tend to acquire government’s endorsement more quickly.
Consequently, as the number of marginal firms among the endorsed venture businesses
increased, it hurt the legitimacy of the government’s initiatives to support venture
business. The Korean government decided to scrap the system by 2006, earlier than
previously planned.
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INTRODUCTION
Like many other developing countries in the age of globalization, South
Korea opened its economy, and has tried to follow internationally accepted
standards. Usually, these efforts are materialized by the adoption of new
institutions, as they are often regarded as having verified their efficiency in
the developed countries. However, the success of imported institutions is
unconvincing at most, and sometimes even ends with failure. Why then is it
so difficult for developing countries to incorporate stable economic institu-
tions? Critics often point to defects in the system itself. Although it seems
plausible at first glance, it only partially explains what happens. The prob-
lem is that institutions successful in their original place often fail in the new
environment. Therefore, more important are the timing and context where
imported institutions are put to work, as well as the response of the people.
In this paper, I will trace the argument against the case of the Korean gov-
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ernment’s policy on venture business. In actuality, this system is not an
imported one, but, in a sense, it represents new policies adopted after the
1997 Asian economic crisis. Contrary to its direct support of companies in
the past, the Korean government only tried to promote these policies indi-
rectly. More specifically, the Korean government gave formal recognition to
promising small venture firms, and thus virtually gave signals of trustwor-
thiness. Also, since this system was initiated during the crisis, it affords a
good opportunity to observe the effects of environmental uncertainty on the
institutional system. 
The system worked as intended, bringing up over 10,000 recognized ven-
ture firms in less than 3 years. Yet, ironically, it was at this time that criti-
cisms about the system began to emerge publicly. Too many recognized
firms reflect malfunctions of the screening process. Neo-institutionalists
assert that when the institutional environment is firmly established, organi-
zations try to embed themselves in it, since such a maneuver dubs them as
legitimate members in the given field. Therefore, as times goes on, the num-
ber of firms having formal recognition has increased. Until this point, the
theory predicts what occurred with the venture firm recognition system of
the Korean government. However, what followed next was the fact that the
increase in the number of recognized firms began to undermine belief in the
system’s ability to only select competent firms. The purpose of this article is
to explain the latter part of the process with two other factors, which are
uncertainty in economic circumstances, and, as a result of uncertainty, orga-
nizations’ strategic and even opportunistic reaction toward institutions. 
THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY ON ORGANIZATION-
AL SURVIVAL
Thus far, many sociologists have emphasized the importance of institu-
tional settings in explaining the economic activities of firms (Hirsch, 1975;
Zucker, 1986; Dobbin, 1995; Dobbin and Dowd, 1997). Especially, Dobbin
and Dowd (1997) demonstrated that the changes in regulatory policies for
the railroad industry in 19th century America were crucial factors explaining
the ups and downs in the number of railroad firms each year. Also, neo-
institutional economist Douglass North (1990) underscored the regulatory
aspect of institution. Yet, the effect of an economic institution is not always
in its regulatory power; rather, in many cases, institutional measures are
designed to affect a firm’s behavior in an indirect and subtle way. 
One of the indirect effects of the institutional system is its role as a general
third-party guarantor in the exchange system. Often in reality, people barely
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knowing each other can make a deal on the basis of the guarantee of an
intermediary who knows both of them, and also on whom they can rely.
Even when none of the actors in the exchange system know each other,
transactions can occur based on the guarantees for them given by an institu-
tional actor, as A in Figure 1. We can regard this as a generalized version of
the third-party trust system (Coleman, 1988). 
In this case, effort is not made to directly regulate economic activities of
firms by an institutional device. Instead, it is meant to elevate the overall
trustworthiness of firms embedded in the given institutional environment,
and therefore to raise the possibilities of exchanges among them. Podolny
(1993) showed that the investment bank which holds a higher position in
the status order among similar firms realized higher profits. Likewise, the
fact that a company has been granted an institutional guarantee will height-
en its reputation in the market, and thus give it more opportunities to make
deals to its advantage. 
The potential of institutional recognition to improve the reputation of its
beneficiary is closely related to the concept of institutional legitimacy in
neo-institutionalism in sociology, and explains why firms are trying to
secure institutional recognitions. This mechanism works on two levels. On
the level of the organizational field (DiMaggio, 1991), the prevalence of a
certain form of organization in a specific area makes people accept it as nor-
mal, and prevents them from questioning its raison d’etre (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977). In such a case, the widespread organizational form is taken as
proper, and organizations that adopt it will be acknowledged as legitimate
members in the field. This is called legitimacy effect. 
Meanwhile, on the level of individual organizations, it is effective to
adopt the legitimate form or practices. By actively embracing them, new
organizations can quickly secure their own legitimacy, and existing organi-
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FIGURE 1. ESTABLISHING GENERAL TRUST BY INSTITUTIONAL MEANS
zations can strengthen their foothold in their territory. Therefore, once firm-
ly grounded, the process of institutionalization propels the diffusion of
organizations with a legitimate form, and as time goes on, the forms of
organizations in a certain organizational field tend to converge on a typical
one. This process is called “institutional isomorphism” (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983).
Legitimacy effect and accompanying institutional isomorphism are
expected to be conducive to the survival of those organizations that adopt a
widely recognized form of organization. In organizational ecology, Hannan
and Freeman (1989) maintain that legitimacy effect raised the rate of sur-
vival. While, in the end, the increase of organizations with a similar form
would lower the rate of survival due to intensified competition among
them, at an early stage, it tends to heighten the possibility of organizational
survival. This is because the prevalence of a certain organizational form
legitimated organizations with similar features. 
In other studies which more directly relate the neo-institutionalist
approach with organizational ecology, Baum and Oliver (1991, 1992) show
that the rate of survival of organizations was higher after they were closely
linked to the institutional environment. In studies of local day care centers
in Canada, their ties to the institutional environment, such as recognitions
from local government or relations with other non-profit organizations,
were found to increase their survival rate not only by providing necessary
resources, but also by formally recognizing and legitimating their existence. 
When there is a stable institutional environment to rely on, firms will try
to embed themselves into it. If this is not the case, central or local govern-
ments will try to arrange it to promote economic activities within their juris-
diction. Once an institutional system is set up, the number of firms with ties
to it will also increase. 
THE DIFFUSION OF AN INSTITUTIONALIZED ORGANIZATIONAL
FORM AND ITS NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS ABOUT INSTITUTIONAL
LEGITIMACY: EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY AND STRATEGIC
RESPONSE OF FIRMS TO THE INSTITUTION
Thus far, it was predicted that once a new institutional system is estab-
lished, an organization will attempt to link itself to the system, and as time
goes on, the number of formally recognized organizations would soon
increase. Two factors seem to determine the degree of the diffusion of insti-
tutionalized organizational forms. One factor is the social context upon
which a new institutional system is put into work. The second is the indi-
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vidual firms’ response to it. 
The social context upon which an institution is introduced profoundly
affects the impact of the institution, since it would delimit and sometimes
change motivations of individual organizations. Even with institutions with
similar contents, actors’ responses to them could be different, depending on
the characteristics of the environment they are surrounded by. 
Among diverse aspects of environmental context, uncertainty has long
been attracting organizational and economic sociologists (March and Simon,
1958). Uncertainty in the environment is detrimental to organizations since
it disrupts the free flow of information among them, and thus reduces
opportunities of exchanges. There are several proposed ways to cope with
this problem. In neo-institutional economic theories, the problems of uncer-
tainty are considered solved by replacing market transactions with
exchanges within hierarchies (Williamson, 1975). Sociologists, disregarding
this solution as too simple and functionalistic, proposed other social mecha-
nisms including social network, power, culture, and institution
(Granovetter, 1985; Perrow, 1986; Powell, 1990; Beckert, 1996; Kim, 1999). 
The positive effect of institutional recognition on organizational survival
implies the possibility of controlling uncertainty through institutional
devices. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) supposed that firms under uncertainty
would follow the dominant organizational form in the field, as it must be
difficult for them to find out the most efficient form for them under uncer-
tainty. If this occurs, it will lead to mimetic isomorphism. Again, Baum and
Oliver (1991, 1992) show that ties to the institutional environment could
raise the rate of survival of individual organizations. 
It is inferred from the results of previous studies that the rise of uncertain-
ty will push firms to act more strategically to quickly secure institutional
recognition. In other words, firms exposed to uncertainty will actively pur-
sue institutional recognitions. Especially if it is a newly founded firm, insti-
tutional recognition can reduce two different types of uncertainty, which are
ego-centric and alter-centric uncertainties (Podolny, 2001). Administrative
and financial supports accompanying institutional recognition, however
slight they may be, can be helpful for a new firm striving to survive through
the early stages of its life cycle. At the same time, it needs to assure potential
investors of its positive prospects and trustworthiness. Also in this regard,
the fact that it has obtained institutional recognition can be highly benefi-
cial. 
Asserting that rising uncertainty will motivate strategic actions by firms
to win institutional recognition should not be misunderstood as meaning
that any firm will have it by merely intensifying its efforts. Any recognition
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system has its deciding rules and screening mechanisms to filter out accept-
able and non-acceptable applicants. Therefore, even under growing uncer-
tainty, it will be firms yielding positive outcomes that can attain institutional
approval. Nonetheless, it is also apparent that the threat from outside will
compel firms in a mire condition to actively pursue institutional approval,
and it is those marginal firms that are in urgent need of it. In this case, we
can imagine that they will try to circumvent regular and stricter screening
procedures in the system, and attempt to achieve institutional recognition
through more lenient or even sometimes problematic means. Particularly,
when the authority in charge has little experience with institutional
approaches in the past, or when the system is imported from outside (this is
the case in most of the developing countries), it is probable that there are
loopholes in the system open to abuses by marginal firms aiming for formal
approval. 
It is good news to firms under uncertainty that they can overcome it
through institutional recognitions. Paradoxically, however, this fact can be a
threat to the institution itself. Generally, firms most vulnerable to uncertain-
ty are least sound and marginally profitable ones. When the overall level of
uncertainty in the market is heightened, these marginal firms are likely to
attempt to obtain institutional supports by whatever means they have. Of
course, every recognition system has its own screening procedures sorting
them out. Yet, if there are loopholes in the process through which these
firms can circumvent its strict screening system, it will not be wholly impos-
sible for them to acquire formal recognitions. As a result, if the proportion of
marginal firms that are endowed with institutional recognitions is increas-
ing, people will become aware of it, and in the end, begin to doubt the
validity of the institution itself. In this case, the attempt to raise the overall
level of trust in the market by institutional means end up as “the misuse of
trust” (Chang, 2001). 
From discussions until now, we can propose two research hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms exposed to uncertainty will acquire institutional recog-
nition more quickly than otherwise.
Hypothesis 2: Faced with higher uncertainty, firms showing poor profitabili-
ty will try to achieve institutional recognition utilizing loop-
holes in the system.
In the next section, we will examine the case of the venture firm recogni-
tion system of the Korean government. Under this system, a firm meeting
certain requirements was officially acknowledged as a venture firm. For
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companies within this system, what mattered seemed to be the improve-
ment of their reputation in the market after recognition by the government,
rather than the small, practical supports accompanying it. Paradoxically, the
validity of the system soon faced severe criticisms when the number of rec-
ognized firms reached its highest point. Two factors are considered in this
section: uncertainty and the strategic reaction of organizations might have
worked in this case. First, the system was introduced when economic uncer-
tainty was high, after the Korean economic crisis in 1997. Second, there were
some categories of recognition vulnerable to the tactical maneuvers of mar-
ginal firms. 
VENTURE FIRMS RECOGNITION SYSTEM
The policy for Venture firms of the Korean Government
In the Korean economy dominated by large firms (often called Chaebols),
small and technology-intensive venture firms seem to represent a new gen-
eration of firms. They began to appear in the early 1980s in fields such as
computers, information and telecommunication, medical devices and S/W.
Despite their early appearance, the Chaebol-oriented policies of the Korean
government remained a block to their steady growth.
This situation drastically changed after the 1997 economic crisis (Lee and
Kim, 2000). Increased societal interest in the information and telecommuni-
cation industry and skepticism about the government’s economic policies
favoring large Chaebols, regarded as a main culprit of the 1997 economic
crisis, altered people’s evaluations of venture firms in Korea. Nonetheless,
investments in new technology often involve high levels of risk-taking, and
thus the likelihood of success is very low. Therefore, investors were unwill-
ing to put their resources in the firms without proper institutional supports.
Under these circumstances, the Korean government’s policy to back up ven-
ture firms provided financial and other administrative supports to them,
and more significantly gave assurance to investors that these firms had
enough potential to make their investments in those firms profitable. 
The most important and prominent feature of the Korean government’s
policy for venture firms is its venture firm recognition system. Under this
system, small firms, which satisfy conditions set forth by the law (the Act on
Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Business of 1997), would be
formally certified as venture firms by the government. Once formally recog-
nized, they are entitled to diverse institutional benefits including tax cuts,
subsidies for technological developments and so on. Above all, however, the
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fact that a firm is given formal recognition by the government works as a
positive signal in the market, and thus can improve its reputation among
other firms and investors. 
In actuality, firms themselves also seem to view the benefits of the venture
firm-recognition system in this way. About 50% of 5,880 venture firms sur-
veyed in 2001 pointed to ‘the improvement of the firm’s publicity,’ and not
to other financial and administrative supports1 as the main benefit of the
system.
The Rapid Increase of Venture Firms: A Success of Institution?
The Korean government’s efforts to promote venture firms by its recogni-
tion system seem to contribute to the rise of venture business in Korea after
the early 1990s. The figure below shows the number of recognized firms in
each month starting from January, 1998. As we see in the graph, within less
than 3 years since the start of the recognition system, more than ten thou-
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1 Publicity, 50.40%; Tax cut, 22.25%; Financial support, 11.35%; Raising employees morale,
6.67%; Other, 6.41.
FIGURE 2. THE NUMBER OF FORMALLY RECOGNIZED VENTURE FIRMS IN KOREA
Source: Small and Medium Business Administration (http://www.smba.go.kr)
sand firms had formal recognition. 
This increase is quite drastic, considering the rather short time period
since the start of the system. Can we then regard this result as a sign of the
success of the Korean government’s attempt to nurture venture firms
through institutional means? On the one hand, the Korean government
seemed to achieve its goal with the system. It quickly discovered and recog-
nized firms qualified for institutional supports, and thus partly contributed
to the boom of venture businesses in Korea in the late 1990s. Further, the
recognition system formally delimited the boundary of venture firms. This
fact is of enormous importance to firms themselves and their investors
since, before that, the boundary was unclear to most of them. As illustrated
by Zuckerman (1999), firms with clear industrial categories proved more
profitable in the stock market. On the other hand, this rapid increase in the
number of recognized venture firms gave rise to concerns about the quality
of recognized firms. The purpose of the system was to filter out promising
firms from other small firms. This function of the system reduces the burden
on investors who, without such a system, have to find promising firms by
themselves. Nonetheless, when there are too many formally recognized
firms in the market, the fact that a firm is formally recognized by the gov-
ernment does not tell much about it. If formal recognition is recklessly
granted to any firm applying for it, the function of the system to select reli-
able firms can be severely impaired. 
The following events seemed to give weight to the second opinion regard-
ing the venture firm recognition system. As soon as the number of venture
firms reached 10,000, criticisms about the system emerged in the mass
media. The point was that the certificate was given to firms that did not sat-
isfy requirements for it. Responding to these criticisms, the authority in
charge of the recognition system, the Small and Medium Business
Administration, raised the required standards for recognitions and applied
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TABLE 1. MONTHLY FLUCTUATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF VENTURE FIRMS IN KOREA
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Total
1998 - - - - 304 427 413 140 230 145 160 223 2,042
1999 91 252 182 334 243 269 310 285 248 259 268 151 4,934
2000 278 334 458 543 563 7 618 519 384 311 382 -533 8,798
2001 350 370 460 420 364 -839 508 341 250 198 145 27 11,392
2002 -106 -52 -176 -319 -158 -399 -349 -91 -141 – – – 9,570
Source: Venturenet (http://www.venturenet.or.kr)
them more strictly than before. As a result, the number of certified venture
firms decreased since early 20022 (see the table below).
It seems paradoxical that the system was criticized at the moment it
achieved its own goal. Most of the criticisms in the media referred to the
mismanagement of the system as the main reason for its failure: its inability
to properly screen applicants. However, this alone does not explain the
increase of applicants in the first place, and it only partially accounts for the
failure of the venture firm recognition system in Korea. 
Previous studies on venture firms in Korea usually highlight the market
performance and CEOs’ characteristics in explaining the success of these
firms (Lee and Choi, 2001; Ahn and Kim, 2002; Lee, 2002). Even when envi-
ronmental factors were considered, they were mainly the degree of competi-
tion and rate of concentration in the industrial sector, or characteristics of
relationships among them (Kim and Han, 1999; Oh, 2002). Most works on
institutional factors tried to present suggestions to promote venture busi-
ness, and therefore studies empirically testing the effects of different institu-
tional settings are rare. This bias in the research of venture companies in
Korea came from tendencies to focus on their efficiency and efficacy, and
consequently led to underestimating their institutional environment. 
In this paper, we argue that the process of the proliferation of an institu-
tionalized organizational form lies behind the drastic increase of recognized
venture firms in Korea. Yet, two other factors, the uncertainty and strategic
response of organizations, added variations to the process, and can even
undermine the validity of an institution. A closer look into the venture firm
recognition system supported these contentions. First, the system began just
before the foreign currency crisis in Korea, and continued throughout large-
scale economic transformations in the aftermath of the crisis. The reform
package of the IMF has enforced overall restructuring of the Korean econo-
my, including the corporate, financial and public sectors. Firms faced with
such rapid transitions are likely to experience enormous uncertainty, since it
meant sudden changes in the rules regulating their behavior. Furthermore,
most of the venture firms were young and small sized firms, and therefore
only barely capable of controlling environmental uncertainty. Hence, at that
time, small firms in Korea must have been eager to acquire institutional
recognition, which was, in this case, venture firm recognition by the Korean
government. 
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2 This partial tendency seems to be due to the fact that for some firms the period for venture
firm recognitions had expired. However, before the changes in the recognition rules, the rate
of re-application for venture firm recognition was more than 60%, but after that it decreased to
30%. It seems that more rigid rules discouraged once recognized firms from re-applying. 
In addition, there were categories of venture business recognition that
seemed to have given opportunities to attain governmental endorsement to
even marginally qualified firms. To be certified by the government, firms
had to satisfy given conditions in one of the following categories: 1) ratio of
expenditures on R&D to sales, 2) the proportion of sales of products from
patent or new technologies certified by the government, 3) funding from
venture capital, and 4) venture business evaluation. The first two categories
stressed the technological competency of applicant firms. To be recognized
as a venture business in those categories, firms had to satisfy clearly defined
necessary conditions: expenditure on R&D as more than 5% of the firm’s
annual sales, or sales of goods or services based on patented or otherwise
certified technologies exceeding 50% of annual sales or 25% of exports.
Therefore, these categories presented more reliable means for screening out
more promising firms. 
To the contrary, the other two categories only require the approval of
third-party agencies. Firms could achieve governmental recognition
through the evaluation of business items by inspecting bodies designated
by the Small and Medium Business Administration (the fourth category).
Since there were many inspecting bodies in diverse areas that applied their
own standards in deciding eligible firms, it was difficult to have consistency
in the selecting criteria. In addition, in the third category, firms that had
more than 10% of their capital from venture capital were also qualified for
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3 This seemed quite true during the heyday of the so-called venture bubble. Some CEOs of
venture firms I interviewed also mentioned this.
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
N. of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Economic crisis 2621 0.388 0.487 0 1
Net profit 2621 0.042 0.161 -0.913 4.330
(10 billion won)
Economic crisis 2621 0.017 0.125 -0.715 4.330
×net profit
LN(asset) 2621 7.468 1.423 2.303 11.295
LN(N of emp.) 2621 3.166 0.973 0 6.907
Age (months) 2621 64.837 81.400 0 1073
Proportion of RND 2621 2.281 1.213 0 6.687
N of patents 2621 0.907 2.897 0 65
Ind. sector 2621 0.593 0.491 0 1
recognition. However, since venture business was booming in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, it was easy for venture companies to find venture capital-
ists willing to invest in them.3 Therefore, firms without a strong technologi-
cal background could have tried to acquire venture business recognition by
utilizing the latter categories. This seems to have been more likely under the
Korean government’s active efforts to boost venture business at that time. 
The figure below shows the annual number of recognized venture firms
in each category. Together, the latter two categories account for more than
50% of total recognized firms after 2000. The last category, venture business
evaluation, is especially noticeable in the graph. Firms belonging to this cat-
egory seem to cause the drastic increase of recognized firms, and also their
accompanying decline.
METHOD AND DATA 
Estimation4
In empirical tests, we will analyze the effects of independent variables on
the probability of firm’s achieving venture firm recognition. Doing so, we
view the process as the movement of a firm among a set of qualitatively dif-
ferent states; that is non-recognized to recognized firm. Since we are model-
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4 Models used in this paper are based on those used by Yee Jaeyeol in his 1993 article (Yee,
1993).
FIGURE 3. THE NUMBER OF VENTURE FIRMS BY THE CATEGORIES OF RECOGNTION
ing changes, they are treated as transition rates. The transition rate from
state j at time t to state k at time t+1 is defined as follows: 
Then, if we construct a probability of moving from i regardless of the des-
tination k, it becomes a hazard rate: 
In the test, a firm is assumed to be recognized as either of the two cate-
gories of venture firm recognition. One is by investment from venture capi-
tal or venture business evaluation, the other is by investment on R&D, or
patented or other accredited new technology. In this case, we also have to
calculate the probability of ending in each destination when transition
occurs. Therefore, the overall transition rate is partitioned into two parts as
below:
rjk (t, t + 1) = h (t, t +1)∙mjk
where h (t, t+ 1) is the overall rate of leaving state j, and mjk is the condi-
tional transition probability defined as the probability of moving from j to k,
provided that a shift occurs. 
I will use the Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the hazard rate
that a firm will move from the state of non-recognition to recognition. In the
Cox proportional hazards regression model (Cox, 1972), the hazard rate for
the jth subject in the data is given as below. 
h(t|xj) = h0(t)exp(xj‚ bx)
The merit of this model is that it makes no assumptions about the shape
of the hazard over time, thus reducing the possibilities that the results of
analysis will be affected by predetermined assumptions, and not by the data
itself. The baseline hazard rate h0 is left not estimated, and just assumed to
be the same for all cases under analysis.
The conditional transition probability, mjk is estimated by using a logit
regression model. It takes the following form: 
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Measurement
Recognition as a venture firm: we examined the length of time spent to
gain venture firm recognition, and then transformed it into monthly annual
spells. From a 30-month time frame covered, the 2,606 cases yield 53,615
monthly spells at risk. Firms are included in the risk set when the recogni-
tion system begins (July, 1997), or when they come into market, in case they
were founded after the beginning of the system, and excluded once they
acquire recognition.
Types of venture firm recognition: The type is coded as 1 if a firm was rec-
ognized as investment from venture capital or venture business evaluation
categories (TYPE1), and 0 if by investments on R&D, or patented or other
acknowledged new technologies (TYPE2). TYPE2 categories place more
emphasis on the firm’s technological potential, and present strict conditions
for qualification, while TYPE1 categories only require approval by diverse
third-party agencies with their own criteria for recognition, thus leaving
room for even barely qualifying firms to be endorsed. 
Degree of uncertainty: At first, to measure the effect of different levels of
uncertainty on the acquirement of venture firm recognition, we tried to
divide the point of time when a firm obtained recognition into two periods,
before the 1997 economic crisis in Korea and after the crisis. However, the
crisis occurred only four months after the beginning of the recognition sys-
tem,5 so it is hard to find out the effect of the different levels of uncertainty
in two periods on the rate of winning recognition. Therefore, instead of
dividing the period itself, we partitioned firms into two groups. One is the
group of firms that existed before the economic crisis, and the other is that
of firms founded afterwards. According to Stinchcombe (1965), organiza-
tions just set up are most vulnerable to disturbances from outside: this is
called ‘the liability of newness.’ Thus, firms founded in the aftermath of the
1997 economic crisis would be subject to uncertainties caused both by the
unstable economic environment and by their immaturity. To the contrary,
old and established firms could better resist such fluctuating situations than
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5 The venture firm recognition system began in July 1997, and the economic crisis occurred
in November, 1997.
under economic conditions following the crisis would try to gain govern-
mental recognition to secure their survival. For estimation, we made a
dummy variable that has a value of 1 for firms founded after the crisis, and
0 for cases otherwise.
Market performance of a firm: Uncertainty in the environment pushed
organizations to move strategically to secure their viability against the prob-
lems caused by environmental uncertainty. This has two implications for
our models. First, as predicted under higher uncertainty, even the firms that
had been previously indifferent to venture company recognition would seek
to achieve it. In this case, firms showing better market performance could
win recognition more quickly than marginal firms. However, facing uncer-
tainty, marginally profitable firms were more eager to gain recognition than
competent firms were. From the prior discussion, it seems that these compa-
nies would try to be formally recognized by satisfying more lenient require-
ments. Thus, second, it is expected that, under uncertain circumstances, the
probability of a firm being recognized as TYPE1 will be high when it shows
poor market performance. 
These predictions imply an interaction effect between a firm’s market per-
formance and the level of uncertainty in each model. To see if this was the
case, interaction terms between them were included in the test. A firm’s
market performance was measured by its ordinary profit and annual sales
when it was officially recognized. The latter was logged because its distribu-
tion was skewed toward the higher values.
Control Variables: Several other variables were included that were
assumed to have an effect on the dependent variable. First, the size effect of
a firm was controlled by inserting its capital and its number of employees
when it was officially registered as a venture firm. It is expected that firms
with more resources will obtain governmental recognition more quickly. All
these variables were used as logged forms. 
The firm’s age is also relevant. As was previously stated, younger firms
were most vulnerable to uncertainty, so they would try to gain institutional
recognition sooner than already established firms. Thus, the firm’s age at
the time of obtaining recognition, counted by months, was included in the
analysis. It is also important to control for the firm’s age, since most firms
founded after the 1997 economic crisis are younger than those founded
before it. 
Considering the aim of the system to support firms developing or using
cutting edge technologies, the proportion of annual R&D expenditure to
annual sales and the number of patents6 were also included. As a matter of
course, firms investing much on R&D and having their own patents will
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gain recognition more quickly. If this is not the case, however, especially in
the categories of recognition explicitly demanding considerable investments
on development of new technologies, it can be regarded as another reason
for criticisms of the system. 
Finally, the industrial sector of the firm was considered. Other things
being equal, firms in the information technology industry and other tech-
nology-intensive sectors will obtain recognition more easily than firms in
conventional sectors, since the main purpose of the Korean government’s
venture firm policies was to support and promote firms in the former areas.
Data
The data used in this paper are from the general survey of venture firms
by the Small and Medium Business Administration in 2000. The sample
includes 6,368 firms out of a total 6,6677 recognized venture firms. 
There are two points to be mentioned about the data set. First, because the
survey was only about firms acquiring venture firm recognition, it com-
pletely excluded cases of firms that failed to do so. Thus, there is apparent
bias in the data-set. Nonetheless, since it is the most comprehensive data-set
of venture companies in Korea, and it is extremely hard to construct more
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6 Similar to the firm’s capital and the number of employees, the proportion of R&D expendi-
ture is that of the year when a firm was recognized. As for the number of patents, there is no
comparable data about it in each year. As a result, the number of firm’s patents in 2000 was
used. 
7 This is the number of all firms that have acquired venture firm recognition by June 2000,
excluding firms still in the stage of foundation.
TABLE 3. CORRELATION MATRIX







LN(asset) -0.309* 0.304* 0.137*
LN(N of emp.) -0.293* 0.234* 0.065* 0.712*
Age -0.532* 0.074* -0.086* 0.383* 0.372*
Proportion of RND 0.329* -0.094* -0.000 -0.391* -0.400* -0.330*
N of patents -0.053* 0.014 -0.022 0.091* 0.061* 0.128* -0.029
Ind. sector 0.166* 0.047* 0.069* -0.056* -0.011 -0.224* 0.217* -0.091*
*p < .05
complete data-sets with a similar size,8 we decided to proceed with this one
until more thorough materials are available. Second, due to the missing val-
ues problem, only 2,621 of the total 6,667 cases were actually used in the
test. To check if there were any considerable differences between the two
sets, we compared means of the variables of each set. Except for the firm’s
age at the time of acquiring recognition, there were no significant differ-
ences, and even in case of the firm’s age, the difference was less than 12
months. The descriptive statistics of variables used in the models and the
correlation matrix are shown below. 
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
The results of the data analysis are reported in the table below. The first
column shows the overall hazard rate from the state of a non-recognized
firm, which is the probability of obtaining recognition without regard to its
category. The second and third columns show type-specific shift rates. The
second table shows the transition rate from a non-recognized to a recog-
nized firm as TYPE1, and the third column shows the rate from a non-recog-
nized to a recognized firm as TYPE2. The last column is the conditional
odds; it shows the ratio between the probability of being recognized as
TYPE1 or as TYPE2, given that a transition in the firm’s state occurs. 
In the first column, the coefficient of the dummy variable indicating firms
founded after the economic crisis is 1.690, and is also statistically significant
(p<.001). This means that post-crisis firms are recognized more quickly than
pre-crisis firms.9 In terms of a firm’s market performance, generally less
profitable companies will achieve recognition more quickly (the coefficient
is -0.940 and statistically significant at p<.001). However, the tendency is
weakened in the case of post-crisis firms. For these firms, the coefficient is
reduced to -0.407 (-0.940 + 0.533 (p<.10)). Although the coefficient of the
interaction term is only marginally significant, this result partly supports
our first prediction that the degree of uncertainty changes the motivation of
each firm, and pushes them into seeking institutional recognition more
actively. It can be inferred that once faced with higher uncertainty, firms
VENTURE FIRM RECOGNITION SYSTEM IN KOREA 139
8 In some articles regarding Korean venture companies, the authors used sampling tech-
niques, and thus avoided similar problems. However, since the returning rate of the question-
naire was quite low (less than 20% in most cases), the actual number of cases used in empirical
tests was no more than 200 cases, or even less than that. 




showing good market performance will concentrate their efforts to obtain
recognition more quickly. 
Similar patterns are found in the second and third columns. By compar-
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TABLE 4. PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF HAZARD RATE, TYPE-SPECIFIC SHIFT RATES FOR
TYPE1 AND TYPE2 CATEGORIES OF RECOGNITION, AND CONDITIONAL ODDS
BETWEEN TYPE1 AND TYPE2 RECOGNITION
Transition rate Transition rate 
Hazard rate from a non- from a non- Conditional 
from a non recognized to recognized to odds between 
recognized - a recognized a recognized firm TYPE1 and 
firm firm as as TYPE2 TYPE2 
TYPE1 category recognition
category
Economic crisis† 1.690**** 2.423**** 1.201**** 1.128****
(0.056) (0.098) (0.074) (0.109)
Net profit -0.940**** -0.060 -1.475**** 0.915*
(0.257) (0.337) (0.364) (0.473)
Economic crisis 0.533* -0.502 1.006** -1.304**
×net profit (0.314) (0.409) (0.508) (0.566)
LN(asset) 0.006 0.161**** -0.111**** 0.305****
(0.021) (0.032) (0.028) (0.046)
LN(N of emp.) -0.058* -0.057 -0.042 0.007
(0.031) (0.048) (0.039) (0.065)
Age†† -0.001*** -0.005**** 0.000 -0.004****
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Proportion of R&D 0.072**** 0.087*** 0.055** 0.035
expenditure to sales (0.019) (0.029) (0.026) (0.040)
N of patents 0.025**** -0.026 0.036**** -0.121****
(0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.026)
Ind. sector††† 0.013 0.113* -0.062 0.177*
(0.042) (0.066) (0.054) (0.091)
Constant -2.959**** (0.321)
Log-likelihood -17495.808 -7086.074 -10250.076 -1617.3751
N with event 2621 1107 1514
N 54061 54061 54061 2621
Conditional 1.00 0.42 0.58
probability
† 1 for firms founded after the 1997 foreign currency crisis; 0 for other firms.
†† counted by months.
††† 1 for firms in information technology sector and precision machinery industry; 0 for firms in con-
ventional manufacturing sectors and others.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001
ing the values of coefficients in two models, however, we can find interest-
ing differences between them. First, the coefficient of the dummy variable in
the second column (2.423 (p < .001)) is higher than that in the third column
(1.201 (p < .001)). It implies that firms recognized as TYPE1 are more sensi-
tive to environmental uncertainty than those recognized as TYPE2.
However, as for firms’ profitability, we fail to find in the second column the
same pattern as found in the first column, while we see that in the third col-
umn. Thus, in terms of market performance, it is firms recognized as TYPE2
that seem to be more sensitive to uncertainty. 
This inconsistency is somewhat solved if we examine the final column. It
shows the conditional odds between TYPE1 recognition and TYPE2 recogni-
tion, given that a shift occurs. First, the coefficient of the dummy variable
indicating a post-crisis firm is 1.128 (p < .001). This means that if it is a firm
founded after the crisis, it has a higher probability of being formally recog-
nized as TYPE1. The change in the coefficient of the firms’ net profit is more
interesting. As for firms set up before the crisis, those yielding larger profits
have higher probabilities of recognition as TYPE1 (the coefficient is 0.915
and is also statistically significant at p < .10). For firms founded after the cri-
sis, however, the direction of the trend is changed. Now, it is firms showing
poor profit that have higher probabilities of TYPE1 recognition (0.915-1.304
(p < .05) = -0.389). This seems to partly explain why, in the second model,
we fail to find a similar pattern that occurred in the first and third models.
This change means that exposed to higher uncertainty, firms with poor mar-
ket performance will also be actively seeking venture firm recognition uti-
lizing its TYPE1 category. Therefore, it supports our second prediction that
marginal firms facing high uncertainty will try to win institutional recogni-
tion, satisfying more lenient requirements in its screening procedures. 
Before we move on, there are several comments about other control vari-
ables. The firm’s size, in terms of its assets, has different effects on the mod-
els for TYPE1 and TYPE2 categories. In the TYPE1 category, larger firms
obtain recognition more quickly, whereas, in the TYPE2 category, smaller
firms do so. The number of employees has a significant effect only in the
model of the overall transition rate, where smaller firms win recognition
more quickly. As for age, younger companies acquire recognition quickly,
and this result complies with ‘the liability of newness’ hypothesis. In all
three models of shift rates, firms that invest heavily in R&D show a higher
rate, but the effects of the number of patents turn out to be different
depending on the categories of recognition. Finally, the effect of the firms’
industrial sector is noticed in the second and third columns. Among compa-
nies recognized as TYPE1, those in the information technology industry and
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other technology-intensive sectors will obtain recognition more quickly, and
the probability of TYPE1 recognition is higher when a firm is in these sec-
tors. 
DISCUSSION
The venture business policy of the Korean government became the focus
of criticism at the very moment when the number of recognized venture-
firms in Korea was record breaking. We have argued that the failure of the
venture-firm recognition system was triggered by greater uncertainty
accompanying the 1997 economic crisis in Korea, and was also exacerbated
by firms’ strategic actions responding to their utilizing the recognition sys-
tem. Neo-institutionalists assert that organizations adopting institutional-
ized organizational forms would raise their chances of survival by obtaining
legitimacy, and that this process resulted in the prevalence of the organiza-
tional form in the field.
In a sense, these predictions turned out to be true in that the number of
venture-firms approved by the Korean government drastically increased.
However, neo-institutionalist approaches so far have not considered how
this process would affect the source of legitimacy, the institution itself. The
case of the venture-firm recognition system of the Korean government
showed that the excessive increase of firms given institutional recognition
has undermined the validity of the system. Our assertion in this paper was
that uncertainty in the market propelled firms’ strategic maneuvers to
acquire governmental recognition, which in turn has accelerated the diffu-
sion of recognized venture-firms. However, if firms showing meager perfor-
mance manage to obtain governmental recognition, taking advantage of this
trend favoring small firms, and as the proportion of those marginal firms
among recognized firms are increasing, then the reliability of the system
will be severely disrupted. 
It is easy to predict that marginal firms will attempt to attain institutional
recognition by satisfying more lenient requirements of the system. The
problem is that without proper means to curb this behavior, the validity of
the system will be jeopardized. When most organizations in the field have
achieved recognition, the fact that a certain organization is recognized will
not improve its reputation in the market as much, as when this is not the
case. This explains why the venture firm recognition system of the Korean
government was widely criticized when the number of recognized venture
firms was around its highest point. In this case, it seems that there was a
trade-off between two contradicting policy goals. On the one hand, the sys-
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tem has to find and give venture firm status to as many promising firms as
possible. On the other hand, if it has allowed recognition to too many firms,
including marginal ones, then venture firm recognition will no longer be
regarded as a useful means of locating competent firms. 
Empirical tests using 2,621 firms supported some of our predictions.
Regrettably, due to the limitations of the data, the scope of analyses was
restricted to firms recognized only until 2000, and therefore missed the
other periods when the number of venture-firms was on a rapidly increas-
ing trend. Yet, given the fact that the anticipated patterns were found even
at the earlier stage, it is highly likely that similar processes have still been at
work, or have even accelerated since then. 
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